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THE FORMATION OF THE BANK OF
ENGLAND
A RESPONSE TO CHANGING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CLIMATE, 1694
Halley Goodman
Great Britain in the late 17th century was a nation in the midst of rapid
flux. International events had recently freed the country to establish multi-
ple colonies in the New World. Economic shifts at home had resulted in
rapid urbanization and a resulting increase in the public need for hard cur-
rency. New joint stock companies were being formed, new goods were
being imported and new markets were being developed. Fueling this eco-
nomic expansion were political changes, which had historically limited the
power of the Crown to confiscate public funds or levy taxes (while not lim-
iting the royal need to fund it military adventures). Such rapid expansion
needed a stable base on which to grow. Out of this need came the formation
of the Bank of England. The formation of the Bank would help meet the
need for greater liquidity in the national marketplace, fuel the increasing
overseas trade and meet the needs of businesses and newly-urban private
individuals, as well as the political and military needs of the Crown; it would
do this, despite opposition from entrenched interests, by replacing the pre-
vious bullion-based economy with a modern, credit-based economy which
would provide the stable financial base needed to fuel the growth of Britain’s
empire.
Britain’s 17th century economic expansion had historical antecedents;
after the Anglo-Spanish wars ended, the once-dominant Spanish navy and
merchant fleet chose to focus primarily on the gold to be found in their pos-
sessions in SouthAmerica and the Caribbean. This left the English, under the
reign of James II, to establish colonies elsewhere and to expand their empire.
It was during this time that England first colonized North America,
Bermuda, Jamaica and the Bahamas. The growth of these colonies caused
an increase in trade, particularly in luxury commodities such as sugar, to-
bacco, furs, tea and coffee. Many other industries expanded rapidly in Great
Britain due to the influx of this new money from the colonies.1 This in-
crease in Atlantic trade, coupled with an ongoing expansion of trade into
India and the rest ofAsia, created a need for financing which was greater that
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what the private bankers at the time could reliably provide.
In response to these expanding economic challenges and opportunities,
there was a rapid growth in the population of the cities, notably London, as
people flocked to urban centers to take advantage of the new opportunities.2
This created an increased demand for goods and services, and a greater need
for currency and available credit to pay for those goods and services.
Adding to that need for credit was the rampant high inflation of the time,
due to the rapid influx of NewWorld gold into European economies, which
in turn led to a loss of real wages for working people.3 This combination of
inflation and economic growth emphasized the growing need for a stable,
centralized source of reliable and affordable credit. A national bank could
offer this while the private banking institutions of the time, relying on lim-
ited private stores of precious metals, could not. These private bankers in-
cluded the goldsmiths, money scriveners, country banks and merchant
bankers.
The goldsmiths evolved to become the original private bankers of the
time. Since goldsmiths already had as part of their trade private stores of
gold and stout vaults to store them in, entrepreneurs could entrust their own
gold to them for safe keeping, for a fee, and receive a paper receipt for the
deposit. The goldsmiths could then lend monies against these deposits for
an additional fee. Mr. HartleyWinters declares that “some ingenious gold-
smith conceived the epock-making notion of giving notes…and so founded
modern banking.”4 Merchants would deposit “their money with the gold-
smiths and received from them receipts” that “…were payable on demand,
and were transferred from one holder to another in payment of debts.”5
These receipts or notes from the goldsmith bankers, often in the form of a
letter, are some of the earliest surviving cheques in England. Given the eco-
nomic realities of the time, although deposits provided the funds for their
business, most of the clients of these goldsmith bankers were usually bor-
rowers rather than depositors.6
Goldsmith bankers carried out numerous types of banking businesses.
They collected deposits at an interest rate of around six percent, and then dis-
tributed notes or bills to their clients which went into circulation. They were
involved in the purchasing and selling of bullion, often carried out foreign
exchange and discounted bills for their clients.7 Goldsmiths deposited their
surplus funds in the Exchequer and would then withdraw the money based
on demand.8
Their operations were self-limiting, however, due to the fact that they
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were restricted by the amount of gold which they had on hand to lend
against. While it is true that many goldsmiths practiced a version of ‘frac-
tional reserve banking’, and typically put more notes into circulation than
they could actually redeem, there was also a limit to creditor’s faith in notes
that were allegedly backed by a finite amount of gold.9 This bullion-based
standard would have to give way to a credit-based economic standard in
order for a more modern economic system to grow.
That there was need of such a change is evidenced by the growth of the
joint-stock companies at the time, which provided the capital for the rapidly
growing overseas ventures. In 1688, the total capital invested in joint-stock
companies was 630,000 pounds; by 1695 it was up to 1,312,049 pounds and
continuing to increase. In the last decade of the century, foreign trade in
general was financed between the levels of 5.6 to 7 million pounds. In order
to support such expenditures, the investors in such companies would even-
tually support the formation of the Bank of England, funded in the manner
of a joint-stock company itself, to replace the private bankers with a safer,
central institution.10
Prior to that, however, the goldsmiths fulfilled the primary banking role
in the nation, and their impact on the economy is evidenced by the fact that
the monarchy frequently relied on them for funds. Charles II, who lived far
beyond his means, needed the goldsmiths to raise money for a standing
army.11 The bankers were able to take advantage of this by charging the
monarch interest rates of up to thirty percent, to bring in enormous profits.12
As a result of these practices, Charles II and his successor James II collec-
tively accrued enormous debt to these private bankers in the amount of
2,250,000 pounds. Converting such figures to modern equivalents can be
difficult, but by one estimate this would be roughly equivalent to over 300
million pounds in 21st century currency.13 When the monarchy, perhaps in-
evitably, defaulted on these sums, a large national deficit resulted.14
Charles II stopped the Exchequer in January of 1672. Debt-ridden and
in need of funds, he seized all the monies from the Exchequer, most of which
belonged to the goldsmiths. This in turn ruined many of the goldsmith
bankers, which sent ripples all through the economy. For example, Vyner
and Backwell, two of the best known goldsmiths in London, were both
forced out of business due to the stoppage of the exchequer.15 Fortunately
for the business of the country, not all of the goldsmiths were ruined; many,
such as the Hoares, the Heriots, theWilliamses, the Childs and the Pinckneys
were not directly affected.16 In fact, perhaps taking advantage of a void in
the market, some new ones began to appear, such as Duncombe and Kent,
who would provide many loans to Charles II and James II and continue to
exist after the Bank of England was created.17
Irrespective of the fluctuating fortunes of the goldsmiths, the stoppage
of the Exchequer and its effects began to sway public sentiment toward sup-
porting the creation of a public institution where the floating capital of the
community might be deposited with safety without the possibility of royal
confiscation”.18
Complicating financial matters at this time was the fact that the gold-
smiths were not the only entrepreneurs engaged in private banking; this role
was also filled by the Money Scriveners, who were financial specialists
“who specialized in conveyancing and mortgage work” and “…acted as in-
termediaries between the tradesmen, merchants and lawyers…who wanted
a safe investment and those borrowing people” who were in need of large
amounts of ready credit to finance their businesses or their lifestyles.19 An
example of such would be London’s Temple family, members of aristocratic
society high up in the social scale, who typically lived far beyond their
means.20 The Temples accumulated enormous debts to the Money Scriven-
ers to meet the social demands of their station, which demonstrates one of
the way London private banking emerged; wealthy families were in need of
credit, and goldsmiths and scriveners were there to supply it. They gave out
interest on deposits and often assumed the function of cashier to merchants.
These scriveners were basically acting as bankers but never established a
banking house from their offices. 21
In addition, there were also numerous country banks and merchants
bankers. Sir Francis Baring, a wealthy London merchant, commented on
one such country bank, the Air Bank. He claims that “the principals on
which those banks were usually established, were insecure, in their being
compelled at all times to invest or employ the deposit left in their hands”
making it difficult to answer a bank run.22 In addition, Baring adds that
when a country bank failed, the catastrophe was felt by all. He thought that
country banks should not be allowed to issue notes payable on demand be-
cause in many situations they did not have the means to repay them.23 There
was a great decrease in confidence in these country banks after numerous
failures to repay depositors, which again added to the public desire for a safe
central banking institution.
Collectively, the goldsmiths and the others basically performed all of the
functions that the Bank of England would later carry out.24 These included
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the “receiving of deposits, the lending of money and … the issue of bank
notes.”25 The private banks carried out these services, but they didn’t pro-
vide enough security to their clients. The public hoped that a bank would
lower the interest rate, because the prevailing rates were so high. In fact, the
interest rate was much higher in England than in other countries in Europe,
and this “rendered trade comparatively disadvantageous to England.”26 Mer-
chants also desired that the future bank would provide a paper currency be-
cause the metallic coins of the day were so debased and they thought the
paper currency would increase the riches of the nation.27
Taken all together, there were obviously many reasons for the commer-
cial interests of the time to support the notion of a central bank. Commer-
cial concerns were not the only relevant interests at the time, however. The
17th century was a time of huge political upheaval in England; the latter half
of the century saw the English CivilWar, the execution of Charles I, the pro-
tectorate under Oliver Cromwell, the resumption of the monarchy and the
overthrow of James II in the ‘glorious revolution.28 All of these events hap-
pened against a background of international religious strife between the
Catholics and the Protestants.
Louis XIV, the King of France, wanted to make Roman Catholicism the
official religion for all of Europe. In England, members of the powerful,
Protestant Whig party suspected that James II, the Catholic King of Eng-
land, supported Louis’ intentions and they sought an alternative. James’
daughter Mary had married PrinceWilliam of Orange, a Protestant, and they
appealed to him for intervention. Following an ‘invited’ invasion, William
was named William III of England in 1689.29 The supporters of James,
however, continued to resist, and fomented rebellion in Catholic strongholds
such as Ireland and Scotland. This required William to put down those re-
bellions while at the same time continuing an ongoing war with Louis of
France.30
His ability to fund such endeavors, however, was limited; as a condition
of ascending the throne, William and Mary had signed to English Bill of
Rights, which restricted the power of the monarchy and did away with its
power to levy taxes without the approval of parliament. As a result, William
had to find other ways to finance his military activities.31 This would ulti-
mately lead to the need for a national bank, but not before other methods
were attempted.
Initially, William asked the City of London for a loan of 100,000 pounds
and was declined. Failing that, the commissioner of the Treasury, Lord
15Halley Goodman
Charles Montague, came up with another scheme, and organized a tontine
loan.32 In such a loan, a purchaser, or subscriber, purchased a life annuity,
the dividends from which increased in amount with the death of any mem-
ber of the class to which the subscriber belonged; subscribers were divided
into classes according to age, with the right of survivorship prevailing only
among members of the same age class. On the death of the last survivor, the
obligation of the government ceased and the capital reverted to the state.33
This loan, although not fully subscribed, raised 881,493 pounds and sup-
ported the war for five years, until 1694.34
During this time, Lord Charles Montague devised a new scheme, in this
case a lottery loan; this secured an additional million pounds; however, an-
other million was needed.35 The inability to raise needed monies by other
means highlighted the need for a central bank from which the crown could
borrow money to fund both its war with France and the suppression of the
Jacobites. William III’s government “realized that the creation of a bank
would be of immense service to them” in order to finance their wars with
France.36
In fact, a model for such a bank already existed, since the Dutch had
formed their own central bank, the Bank ofAmsterdam, in 1609. The British
looked to the successful merchants and bankers of Holland as a model and
many wanted to imitate the Dutch bank, an institution which was seen as a
great success.37 Augmenting this was the fact that the new monarch,
William, was of Dutch extraction, and knew first-hand the value of such a
Bank to the national economy.38 The British saw that the Bank of Amster-
dam had reduced interest rates to Dutch borrowers, traders and landowners,
and thought that a central British bank would do the same.39 The Bank of
Amsterdam was extremely prosperous throughout the entire seventeenth
century and was looked upon as a model bank throughout the entire world.40
The British had been competing with the Dutch in establishing their com-
mercial and colonial empires throughout the 17th century; it is only natural
that due to this competition, they would be eager to keep up with the Dutch
financially as well.
So eager were they, in fact, that although the Bank was not actually char-
tered until the 1690’s, there was much talk of the foundation of such a bank
all through the century, and many schemes were developed which never
came to fruition. For example, a London merchant, Samuel Lambe pro-
posed one early such scheme to a committee in parliament in 1658. There
were many other pamphlets and proposals during this time, but they all suf-
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fered from the same failing, and were all turned down for the same reason;
because parliament saw that with a national bank, the king would be able to
get money without parliament’s consent.41 In 1683, an attempt was made to
form a ‘National Bank of Credit’ at Devonshire House, but it was short lived.
Its main responsibility was “to advance money to tradesmen and manufac-
turers, on the security of goods.”42 It failed for the same reason as the ear-
lier plans; the fear of royal confiscation and “a speculative mania which has
suddenly spread and was diverting public attention from serious schemes.”43
As has been stated earlier, however, the adoption of the Bill of Rights by
William and Mary in 1689 alleviated the concern regarding royal confisca-
tion, and finally opened the way for the bank to be formed.
It wasWilliam Patterson, a London merchant, who was the true founder
of the Bank, as his efforts, after several failed attempts, resulted in the na-
tional bank’s foundation in 1694. He made his first proposal in 1691, “to
form a company to lend a million pounds to the Government at six percent
(plus 5,000 “management fee”) with the right of note issue.”44 In 1692,
Parliament made a committee to consider proposals for raising money, since
the government was desperate for more money for the war. The committee
rejected Patterson’s proposal. He then created another scheme, to loan two
million dollars to the government; however, nothing came of this scheme
either.45 However, in 1693, after already creating his lottery loan, Lord
Charles Montagu, the commissioner of the treasury, encouraged Patterson to
draft another proposal, which was designed to “raise 1,200,000 to be lent to
the government at 8 per cent. On condition that the subscribers were incor-
porated and that 4000 per annum should be allowed them for expense of
management.”46 Patterson created a pamphlet that explained the economic
principles of his bank.47
This was necessary, because support for the bank’s creation was no
means universal. The primary political groups which were in opposition
were the Jacobite supporters of the deposed King James and the landown-
ing Tories. Both groups feared that the government would be strengthened
and their own influence diminished by the establishment of a national bank.
The Catholic Jacobites though that the creation of the bank would weaken
France’s monarchy.48 The Tories, in turn, thought that the bank “would lead
straight to socialism” or a commonwealth.49 The Tories also opposed the
Bank because it would strengthen King William III’s power by making it
easier for him to obtain money; this would make it less likely for the House
of Stuart to be restored.50
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In addition to politically motivated opposition, there were other con-
cerns as well. Many merchants feared that the incorporated bank might turn
into a monopoly over all of England’s banking business, while the country
gentry thought that a central bank would make borrowing impossible by
raising interest rates.51 The goldsmiths, naturally, were also against the es-
tablishment of a bank because they feared that national bank would be a
great competitor to their business and their profits would be greatly re-
duced.52
All of these enemies of the Bank of England joined together into one op-
posing force to arouse public opinion. One of their main points of con-
tention was that the bank would control all of the money in the kingdom at
the risk of the merchants and charge high interest rates. They also argued
that the bank would gain too much power and if it did not succeed, English
commerce would be in ruins. The conservative Tories claimed that a na-
tional bank would lead Great Britain towards a republic, while on the other
hand, the opposingWhigs worried that a national bank would lead to an ab-
solute monarchy, by providing the king with unlimited funds. Even though
many of these arguments seem contradictory, the opposition was extremely
successful in arousing public fear against the creation of a national bank.53
All of this opposition notwithstanding, a bill to create a national bank
was submitted to The Committee of Ways and Means in the House of Com-
mons in 1684. Not surprisingly, it was met with vigorous debate in parlia-
ment, both in the House of Commons and the House of Lords.54 With
Montague’s help, however, it was accepted by the House of Commons in
April of that year, with some modifications. Due to some Whig apprehen-
sion, an amendment was added which forbade the corporation “from lend-
ing money to the crown or from purchasing Crown lands without the consent
of Parliament.”55 In order to appease traders, another amendment was also
added by the House of Commons forbidding the bank from dealing in goods
and commodities.56 There was much more debate and opposition in the
House of Lords; however, there was a majority of twelve and the bill was
passed.57 Many have noted “that the Act was only passed to avoid embar-
rassment to the Government, which needed the money immediately and
could not obtain it otherwise;” many politicians who agreed to the act did-
n’t even realize the other advantages that this bank would provide to the
state and to the nation’s credit.58
On April 25th, 1694, the principles of Patterson’s proposal were encom-
passed in the Tunnage Act, which was passed by the House of Commons
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and the House of Lords, allowing the government to borrow 1,200,000 at
eight percent interest, with 4,000 for management expenses.59 This loan al-
lowed William to carry out his war with France, which lasted from 1690 to
1697.60 The corporation was not originally intended to be a monopoly, how-
ever, it ended up being the only Joint Stock Bank and its monopoly was later
affirmed under the reign of Queen Anne.61
Under the rules by which it was incorporated, the Bank had to lend all
of its capital to the government, could not borrow more than its capital, and
“its business was restricted to buying and selling bullion, gold or silver, and
dealing in Bills of Exchange.”62 On June 21, 1694, individuals were allowed
for the first time to subscribe to the Bank of England. No individual could
subscribe over 10,000 pounds before July 1st, and after that date one could
subscribe more than 20,000 pounds. Additionally, each subscriber was “per-
sonally liable in proportion the amount of their stock.”63 On the first day,
300,000 pounds were subscribed and within three days, that figure was up
to 600,000, which was enough for the bank to become a corporation; by July
2nd, the entire subscription was collected.64 All of the subscribers to the loan
were formally incorporated under the title The Governor and Company of
the Bank of England.65
On July 27th, 1694, the charter of the Bank of England was sealed. The
charter secured the corporation’s life for twelve years, at which time the
government could renew the charter or annul it. Among the provisions of
the charter, it designated a location for the Bank’s headquarters, which were
to be at Mercers’Chapel.66 It also mandated the management structure for
the Bank; it was to consist of a governor, a deputy governor and twenty-four
directors to be elected each year; all of whom were required to be natural
born British citizens. The charter also said “that no dividend shall at any
time be made by the said governor …save only out of the interest, profit or
produce arising out of the said capital stock or fund.”67 The governor, deputy
governor and each director were required to own 4,000 pounds, 3,000
pounds and 2,000 pounds respectively of stock in the corporation. There
were also to be fifty-four secretaries and clerks.68 The charter additionally
claims that there will be general courts that require twelve directors or gov-
ernor to exist, and that these courts are to be summoned four times a year.
These general courts can also be called at any time, if nine or more propri-
etors call for it.69 These courts had the power to create by-laws and to set
the governor’s and director’s salaries.70 The charter listed the names of the
twenty-one directors, the deputy governor, Michael Godfrey and the Gov-
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ernor, Sir John Houblon. William Patterson was one of the original direc-
tors but ended up resigning in 1695 after disagreements with the other di-
rectors.71 The directors, governor and deputy governor were elected on
July 11th, 1964 by the 663 proprietors who each had more than 500 shares
of stock.72 The bank prospered from the beginning because of the personal
notoriety of many of the directors and shareholders, who provided credibil-
ity for the institution. Many well-regarded wealth financiers and commer-
cial merchants of high standing became shareholders.73
All of the capital of the bank was lent to the government and thus the
shareholders money was in the king’s hand. The government had to pay
back the loan by 1705. The bank also had the power to issue notes up to the
amount it had leant to the government. The bank discounted British bills at
six percent and foreign bills at four and a half percent in order to encourage
people to deposit money.74
The simple fact of the Bank’s existence did not quell all of the opposi-
tion to it, of course. Shortly after its founding, William Patterson wrote a
dissertation in support of the Bank and describing its economic purpose, as
a public retort to the arguments of the Jacobites and the Tories.75 He argues
that all money without intrinsic value is false and worthless. He then goes
on to state that all other forms of currency’s value can only be determined
by its comparison to gold and silver and that credit must be founded on gold
or silver. In addition, he contends that the bank will help landowners and
traders by lowering interest.76 Many of the supporters of the Bank declared
that it “would rescue the nation out of the hands of extortioners, lower in-
terest, raise the value of land, renew public credit, extend circulation, and im-
prove commerce.”77
In the Bank’s first year, general court meetings were held extremely fre-
quently, often up to a few times a week. At the first general court held at
Mercers’ hall, the directors and the governor devised three methods for de-
positing monies. A depositor could either “receive ‘Running-Cash Notes’
payable on demand either in whole or in part,….keep a ‘book or paper’
wherein amounts received and paid on their account would be entered up at
the Bank; or they might draw ‘notes’ on the Bank, to the extent of their de-
posits.”78 These three different options provided depositors with a secure
method of storing their money. At a general court meeting on July 30th,
1694, the Director’s appointed a staff of cashiers, tellers, doorkeepers and
messengers to deal with the business of the bank.79 The tellers had to be
specifically wary of accepting goldsmith’s money at this time, because much
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of it was debased coinage.80 The fixed hours of the bank were from eight
am to five pm; however, the bank was closed on Sunday’s and holidays.81
With these governing principles in place, the Bank functioned smoothly
through its first year, gaining public approval. Those factions allied against
it, however, continued to voice their opposition, such that of Michael Godrey
in 1695. A wealthy London merchant and the deputy governor of the bank,
he felt the need to publish a Short Account of the Bank of England, which
sought once again to defend the bank against its opposition’s arguments. He
writes that such opposition stems “from prejudice, false insinuations, or mis-
taken notions…from self interest.”82 He states that all of the opponent’s ar-
guments against the bank are based on their private interest, and that the
benefits and advantages that the bank will bring to the large public of the na-
tion surpass any of the arguments of the naysayers.83 He claims that the
main advantage of the Bank is that “a loan was granted to the government
at an exceptional rate” which “enabledWilliam to take the offensive in Flan-
ders and to secure his first successes.”84 He goes on to emphasize that the
bank helped to make the voting process for taxes more efficient, and that
the bank also provides a secure place for the public to store their deposits,
receive interest upon them, and withdraw them whenever desired. Godfrey
proclaims that bank provides enormous mutual benefits to both the public
and government.85 In this pamphlet he also tried to assuage the fears of the
Tories by emphasizing that the Bank would lower interest rates and increase
the land’s value by 100 million pounds.86
Two years later, in 1697, Sir Francis Baring, a British merchant banker,
in turn documented his initial thoughts on the Bank of England and currency
in his essay “Observations on the Establishment of the Bank of England and
on the Paper Circulation of the Country.” Baring attributes the wealth and
prosperity that Great Britain had experienced to the founding of the Bank of
England. He states that the bank’s object in circulating bank notes was “to
increase commercial discounts.”87 He also claims that paper is a better
medium for circulation than gold because it is easier to manage and ex-
change; not only is it necessary but he claims that it is indispensible.88 Ac-
cording to Baring, the issuance of bank notes should only increase in
proportion to the increase of the nation’s commerce. Baring divides the
Bank’s operations into three main categories: General circulation, transac-
tions with the government, and commercial discounts.89 He explains that it
is essential for the directors not to extend the issue of notes “beyond that the
currency of the country requires, and can support.”90 He adds that the di-
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rectors should be checked and “limited in the amount for which their notes
shall be issued, as a security to the pubic with regard to the private interest
of the Bank.”91
Despite these published statements of support for the Bank’s operations
and goals by the merchant and financial community, neither the goldsmith’s
nor the Tories restricted themselves to passive opposition; both groups at-
tempted to act against the Bank’s interests. The goldsmiths tried to embar-
rass the Bank in its early years largely out of jealousy; the Bank’s existence
greatly diminished their business and lowered their discounts.92 “The private
bankers…strove to ruin the reputation of their hated rival by plotting against
its credit.”93 For example, legend has it that one Charles Duncombe, a for-
mer goldsmith, a Tory and ultimately one of the wealthiest commoners in
England, quietly bought up a very large number of Bank shares, 80,000
pounds worth in all, and abruptly sold them all in 1695 in an attempt to dam-
age the Bank’s credit and stock price.94
More credibly, it is known that the goldsmiths collectively organized a
run on the Bank in May of 1696. After the Bank’s initial opening, many
goldsmiths chose to do business with it; goldsmith bankers such as Hoare,
Freame, Gould and Barclay all opened accounts at the bank.95 They used
these accounts as a place to deposit Bank notes which had come into their
possession during the course of business, and to make withdrawals as
needed.96 However, they used these accounts to their advantage and the
Bank’s disadvantage during the Currency Reform of 1686.97 At that
time, in an attempt to rid the market of debased and clipped coinage, the
government had mandated that old coins would be deemed valueless and
withdrawn from circulation on May 4; however, due to mismanagement and
poor timing by the treasury, there were insufficient new ones available to
take their place. Seeing the delicate situation that this created for the Bank,
the goldsmiths en masse demanded full payment of their accounts, leaving
the Bank without enough coin to meet the suddenly increased demand. This
required John Houblon, the Governor, to suspend full cash payment, prom-
ising a prompt partial payment in coin and the balance as soon as additional
new coin could be obtained from the mint.98 This led to a discount on the
Bank’s notes of up to twenty percent and a temporary discredit of them,
which, naturally, was beneficial to the goldsmith’s business.99
Despite such mutual hostility, however, the Bank persevered and the
goldsmiths ultimately had to do business with it. In turn, the Bank began to
straighten out “its relations with the goldsmiths” to prevent “a rival com[ing]
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into the field with full parliamentary backing.”100 The Tories, in their turn,
desired to create a rival bank to the Bank of England to express their oppo-
sition and in the hopes of weakening the rival Bank. A proposal for a Land
bank was submitted to the House of Commons in 1693 and in 1696 it was
passed and the bank was created. The brain behind the Land bank was Dr.
Hugh Chamberlain, an accoucheur, (a male midwife or obstetrician) who
was backed by Harley and Foley.101 The bank “was to raise a loan and issue
notes secured on freedhold land” and land “was to be the basis of its paper
currency.”102 The land bank was incorporated “to lend money on land at a
low interest” and was prohibited from using its stock to buy and sell com-
modities.103 The king was to use this loan for his war campaigns against
France. Many of Chamberlain’s notions in the scheme were “so monstrous
and palpable an absurdity;” as to be completely unworkable; for example, he
said that “a lease for a hundred years was worth four times as much as the
fee simple” which is simply not true.104 The Land Bank projectors wanted
ready money for the state, but the land bank scheme was not drawn out ap-
propriately to supply this.105 The Bank of England, the treasury officials
and the city of London all opposed this Land Bank. In addition, since it was
a Tory plan, it was vehemently opposed in Parliament by the Whigs, and in
the face of this combined opposition the whole scheme ended up being a
failure; within six months the bank was obsolete.106
It did not completely fail in its intent, however, since during its brief ex-
istence it did palpable damage to the Bank of England, as the Tories had
hoped. The Land Bank’s opening forced the Bank of England’s shares down
from 107 to 83. Many saw the Land Bank as a strong rival that offered a
much lower interest rate for borrowing, even though in retrospect it was
doomed for failure. The crown had supported the Land Bank, who was
going to lend them a great sum of money; after the Land bank’s collapse the
government went to the Bank of England for assistance. The government
asked the Bank “to increase its capital and to accept depreciated tallies in
payment of the new subscription” which greatly aided the crown at the
Bank’s expense.107 As a result of the Land Bank’s creation and then immi-
nent failure, the Bank of England was forced into a precarious situation.
It was not harmed in the long run, however. The Bank’s great strength
was that, in response to the previously existing fear of Royal default on
Crown obligations, it served as a “commitment device,” making the gov-
ernment’s promise to pay its debts trustworthy.108 It also set up transparent
regulations for all financial dealings between the people, parliament and the
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Crown.109 With the confidence which this inspired in the marketplace, the
Bank’s notes became readily accepted throughout the nation, which opened
the way for a more credit-based economy, gradually replacing the bullion-
based system of the goldsmith bankers. Paper money could now be issued,
not for gold, but for intangibles, such as revenues on land, tax receipts and
commercial obligations. This acted to increase the wealth of the nation by
recognizing and providing credit for previously unrecognized forms of
wealth.110 This rise in wealth in evidenced by, among other things, the steady
increase in investment in the great joint-stock companies through the early
part of the 18th century, and the concurrent rise is real per-capita income in
the nation.111
To conclude, the Bank was founded in response to a confluence of his-
torical forces, which included a new political structure for the nation, private
business interests, an increase in overseas trade and a simultaneous rise in
urbanization. These forces provided new confidence for investment as well
as a rising need for affordable credit, based on a standard more flexible than
the bullion-base of the goldsmith bankers. With the successful Dutch Wis-
selbank to serve as a model, the Bank of England provided the capital and
the security which allowed England to grow into the next century’s great
world power.
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